

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5456

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 TOKYO 2869

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: OVERVIEW STATEMENT

REF: (A) 77 STATE 291277 (B) 77 STATE 295583

1. FOLLOWING IS BRIEF OVERVIEW STATEMENT ON BROAD APPROACHES
EMBASSY IS TAKING TOWARD ACHIEVING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SET FORTH
IN REFTEL B:

2. GOAL I - "A CLOSER AND MORE HARMONIOUS OVERALL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN."

3. WE WILL CONTINUE TO UTILIZE THE MYRIAD EXISTING FORUMS AND
INSTITUTIONS--FORMAL AND INFORMAL, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE--TO
INCREASE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES, ATTITUDES,
AND NATIONAL DECISIONS. MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN US ALMOST INVARIABLY ARISE FROM FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
ACCURATELY AND RAPIDLY. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN JAPAN THAT
THE LEADERSHIP ELITES BE AWARE OF WHAT WE INTEND TO DO. IN ADDI-
TION TO KEEPING FORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OPEN, WE WILL CONTINUE
TO USE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOP NEW MEANS TO MAKE SURE THE
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JAPANESE NOT ONLY HEAR WHAT WE ARE SAYING BUT KNOW THE REASONS
WE ARE SAYING IT.

4. GOAL II - "AN IMPROVED BILATERAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATION-
SHIP COUPLED WITH GREATER JAPANESE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT ON
MULTILATERAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES."

5. OUR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE (REFTEL B PART II) ARE BOTH THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AND THE MOST IMMEDIATE WE FACE IN RELATION TO JAPAN. FOREIGN TRADE IS INDISPENSABLE TO JAPAN'S ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND PROSPERITY, AND JAPAN DEPENDS ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS EVEN MORE THAN WE DO. JAPAN THEREFORE NEEDS AN OPEN WORLD TRADING SYSTEM MORE THAN MOST COUNTRIES AND HAS THE MOST TO GAIN FROM STRENGTHENING IT. AN IMPROVED PUBLIC DIALOGUE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

6. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IS JAPAN'S SATISFACTION WITH THE STATUS QUO. JAPANESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN, ARE RATHER WELL SERVED AS THINGS STAND, AND THE JAPANESE ARE INNATELY CONSERVATIVE IN APPROACHING CHANGE. POTENTIAL GAINS FOR JAPAN FROM LIBERALIZATION THEREFORE DO NOT ALWAYS APPEAR COMPELLING, SO SOMETIMES WE MUST POINT OUT TO THEM THE RISK OF REAL LOSSES FOR JAPAN FROM POSSIBLE PROTECTIONIST RESTRICTIONS IN THE U.S. OR THE EC. SUCH PRESSURES ARE MOST EFFECTIVE IF REMINDERS OF THE RISKS ARE DELIVERED PRIVATELY AND AT A HIGH LEVEL.

7. SINCE THE PROBLEMS OF JAPAN'S HUGE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO JAPAN AS A MARKET ARE GLOBAL IN THEIR IMPACT, WE WILL EXPAND OUR USE OF MULTILATERAL APPROACHES WHILE AVOIDING ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE ARE "GANGING UP." OUR STRONGEST LEVERAGE WITH JAPAN ON GLOBAL ECONOMIC ISSUES IS OUR SHARED INTEREST IN MAINTAINING AN OPEN WORLD TRADING SYSTEM. IN SOME
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PAST CASES IT HAS BEEN ENOUGH IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS TO LET THE JAPANESE JOIN A CONSENSUS AND GO ALONG WITH NEW ARRANGEMENTS. IN THE FUTURE, HOWEVER, THAT WILL OFTEN NOT BE ENOUGH AND WE SHOULD PRESS THEM TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

8. STIMULATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (BUT NOT THE EXPORT SECTOR) WILL BE PURSUED BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY BY MEANS OF STEADY BUT RESTRAINED PRESSURE AT ALL LEVELS OF CONTACT. THE SAME APPLIES TO OTHER ECONOMIC ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THE REDUCTION OF JAPAN'S CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS WHICH WE SEE AS A LONGER RANGE ISSUE WHICH WILL NOT BE FULLY RESOLVED IN LESS THAN THREE YEARS. WE WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON BILATERAL APPROACHES AND ESTABLISHED CHANNELS TO ADVANCE THESE INTERESTS, BUT GIVE EMPHASIS TO NEW MECHANISMS SUCH AS THE JOINT TRADE FACILITATION COMMITTEE (TFC). THE JOINT ECONOMIC FORECASTING STUDY GROUP WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR DEMONSTRATING OUR CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED FOR EXPANDING INTERNAL DEMAND IN JAPAN AS A PRINCIPAL MEANS OF REDUCING JAPAN'S CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS, BUT WE SHOULD AVOID SEEING TO USE IT AS A PERFORMANCE MONITORING DEVICE SO AS NOT TO OFFEND JAPANESE OFFICIALS WHO ARE SENSITIVE ABOUT THE AUTONOMY OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC DECISIONS.

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9. A FULL SCHEDULE OF CONTACTS AT ALL POLICY LEVELS IS THE BEST METHOD OF KEEPING UP THE MOMENTUM AND ENGAGING JAPAN'S HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL BUREAUCRACY IN THE PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURING THE JAPANESE ECONOMY AND RESOLVING TRADE ISSUES. A MAJOR FACTOR IN DEALING WITH JAPAN IS THE GREAT EXTENT OF INFLUENCE AND INITIATIVE AT THE DIVISION CHIEF LEVEL. CONTACTS AT THAT LEVEL DESERVE AND WILL RECEIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION BY OFFICERS OF ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT RANK. EXTRA EFFORT AT THAT LEVEL HAS BEEN PRODUCTIVE IN THE PAST AND WILL REMAIN SO.

10. ISSUES SUCH AS CIVIL AVIATION AND STEEL, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS NOT FORESEEN, HAVE A POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTION OF NOT MANAGED WITH A JUDICIOUS MIXTURE OF FIRMNESS, PATIENCE, AND GOOD WILL. YOUR STYLE WILL BE TO ISOLATE THESE ISSUES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM OTHER AREAS, RESOLVING THEM ON THEIR OWN MERITS, WORK TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND AVOID "QUICK FIXES" WHICH MIGHT IN THE END BE COSTLY.

11. TRADE PROMOTION WILL BE MOST SUCCESSFUL WHEN BACKED BY A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO BROAD TRADE POLICY ISSUES. AS A STRONG ECONOMY HEAVILY IN SURPLUS, JAPAN CAN AFFORD AND WILL ITSELF BENEFIT FROM MEASURES TO LIBERALIZE IMPORTS, TO EXPAND AND

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IMPROVE UNTIED FOREIGN AID, AND GENERALLY TO INCREASE ACCESS TO ITS ECONOMY. WHILE WE WORK TO CONVINCE U.S. EXPORTERS TO EXPLOIT THESE OPPORTUNITIES WITH A REALISTIC AND LONGER TERM APPROACH TO BOTH THE COSTS AND THE BENEFITS, WE MUST ALSO WORK TO FACILITATE TRADE BY IDENTIFYING AND SEEKING THE RELAXING OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL GOVERNMENT IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPORTS.

12. GOAL III - "A STRENGTHENED DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WHICH FEATURES INCREASED JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY TREATY."

13. THE RETURN OF OKINAWA, THE END OF THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, CHINA'S CHANGED VIEWS ON THE SECURITY TREATY, AND A LONG PATIENT EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN BY GOJ LEADERS, HAVE CREATED A CLIMATE IN WHICH SECURITY ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED MORE OPENLY AND LESS PASSIONATELY, AND IN WHICH BOTH THE SECURITY TREATY AND THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES HAVE ACHIEVED GREATER PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE.

14. AT THE SAME TIME THERE REMAIN LEGAL AND POLITICAL BARRIERS TO JAPAN'S RAPIDLY DOING MORE IN THE SECURITY AREA. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS, ALTHOUGH LOOSENING, AS WELL AS U.S. ARMS EXPORT POLICY, TEND TO RETARD THE PACE OF PLANNING FOR DEFENSE COOPERATION. MOREOVER, THE DECISION GRADUALLY TO WITHDRAW U.S. GROUND FORCES FROM THE ROK HAS CREATED CONCERN ABOUT FUTURE U.S. INTENTIONS IN EAST ASIA AND THE VALIDITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. THIS HAS LED TO SOME SPECULATION ABOUT THE NEED FOR JAPAN TO REEXAMINE ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND FOR JAPAN TO CONSIDER ADOPTING A MORE "SELF-RELIANT" POSTURE.

15. THE U.S. WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE REALISTIC APPROACHES TO DEFENSE ISSUES, BUT WILL RESPECT THE NEED FOR THE JAPANESE TO PROCEED AT THEIR OWN PACE SIMPLY BECAUSE TO FORCE IT MIGHT WELL PREJUDICE SUCCESS. IN MORE SPECIFIC TERMS, WE SHOULD

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IN THE YEAR AHEAD:

A. KEEP THE GOJ APPRISED AT VARIOUS LEVELS IN AS COMPLETE AND CANDID A FASHION AS POSSIBLE OF OUR SECURITY PLANNING, AND OUR THINKING WITH RESPECT TO ALL MAJOR SECURITY ISSUES.

B. USE EXISTING CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS, INCLUDING SCG, SDC, AND SSC, BOTH TO KEEP THE JAPANESE INFORMED AND TO DRAW OUT THEIR THINKING AND ENCOURAGE A COMMON APPROACH TO SECURITY ISSUES.

C. HOLD A MEETING OF THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WITHIN THE YEAR TO INDICATE OUR CONTINUED APPRECIATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MOST SENIOR-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE BODY OF THE SECURITY TREATY FRAMEWORK.

D. CONTINUE TO EXPLORE WITH THE JAPANESE WAYS BY WHICH THE GOJ MIGHT INCREASE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN.

E. SUSTAIN PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, SUPPLEMENTED BY EXCHANGES AT OTHER SENIOR LEVELS.

E. ASSURE THAT AS A GENERAL RULE WE ACCORD JAPAN TREATMENT EQUAL TO THAT OF OUR NATO ALLIES IN REGARD TO EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND THE RELEASE OF TECHNOLOGY.

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F. USE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASSETS, INCLUDING EXCHANGES AMONG U.S. AND JAPANESE SECURITY EXPERTS TO EXPLAIN U.S. SECURITY POLICIES.

16. GOAL IV - "AN EXPANDED AND MORE SUPPORTIVE JAPANESE ROLE IN RESOLVING MULTILATERAL POLITICAL ISSUES."

17. BY AND LARGE THE JAPANESE PERCEIVE THEIR ESSENTIAL MULTI-LATERAL POLITICAL INTERESTS IN TERMS SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. IN RECENT YEARS THE GOJ HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE A MORE POSITIVE AND ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC ROLE WHICH WOULD BOTH COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THAT OF THE USG. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN GRADUAL, HOWEVER, AND CONTINUES TO BE INHIBITED BY VARIOUS FACTORS:

A. A RELUCTANCE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ISSUES AND REGIONS FAR- REMOVED FROM MORE TRADITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE JAPANESE INTEREST.

B. A LONG-STANDING TENDENCY TO KEEP INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY APOLITICAL, WITH A CONSEQUENT UNWILLINGNESS IN PARTS OF THE GOJ TO COMMIT ECONOMIC RESOURCES FOR ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL ENDS.

C. A SENSITIVITY TO ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY EVEN HINTING OF
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OVERSEAS MILITARY ENTANGLEMENT OR DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH RESOURCE-SUPPLIERS IN THE THIRD WORLD.

D. RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES THAT MIGHT STRIKE A RESPONSIVE CHORD AT HOME IF THEY ARE LIKELY TO LEAD TO CONFLICTS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

18. WHILE WE MUST TAKE CARE TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF PRESSURING THE JAPANESE TO ACT AS A "SURROGATE" FOR THE U.S. ON PARTICULAR ISSUES, THERE ARE SEVERAL COURSES OF ACTION THE EMBASSY AND THE USG AS A WHOLE CAN CONTINUE TO FOLLOW WHICH WOULD HAVE A SUBTLE BUT SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN SHAPING JAPANESE POLICIES. WE SHOULD IN THE YEAR AHEAD:

A. CONTINUE TO OFFER EXPRESSIONS OF ENCOURAGEMENT, SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, FROM VARYING LEVELS OF THE USG, FOR JAPANESE EFFORTS TO PLAY A MORE POSITIVE POLITICAL ROLE, AND WE SHOULD COMBINE THIS WITH CONCRETE SUPPORT FOR SPECIFIC JAPANESE INITIATIVES, SUCH AS THEIR EFFORT TO GAIN A UN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT.

B. CONTINUE CLOSELY TO COORDINATE POLICIES AND TACTICS THROUGH BOTH FORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND MORE INFORMAL CONTACT, NOT ONLY IN EXISTING AREAS OF COOPERATION SUCH AS ARMS CONTROL BUT ALSO IN NEW FIELDS, SUCH AS OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES TOWARD ASEAN.

C. MAKE GREATER EFFORTS TO INCLUDE THE JAPANESE IN OUR EARLY STAGES OF POLICY FORMULATION, AND PROVIDE THEM AS EXPLICIT INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE NOT ONLY AS TO THE DETAILS OF OUR MULTILATERAL POLICIES BUT ALSO HOW BEST THEY MIGHT PLAY A SUPPORTIVE ROLE.

D. INCREASE OUR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND ANALYSES NOT ONLY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOJ, BUT WITH
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THE DIET AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNITY IN AN EFFORT TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN JAPANESE UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS IN WHICH JAPAN HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN LITTLE

INVOLVED, SUCH AS AFRICA.

19. GOAL V - "GREATER JAPANESE COOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES."

20. MORE THAN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, JAPAN HAS SPECIAL SENSITIVITIES IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NONPROLIFERATION STEMMING FROM ITS HISTORY AS THE ONLY COUNTRY EVER TO HAVE SUFFERED FROM A NUCLEAR BOMBING ATTACK BUT AT THE SAME TIME FROM ITS PERCEPTION THAT ITS VIRTUALLY TOTAL LACK OF ENERGY RESOURCES MAKE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE FUTURE IMPERATIVE.

21. JAPAN'S NON-PROLIFERATION AIMS PARALLEL OUR OWN, BUT GREAT ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE WAY IN WHICH WE SOLICIT JAPANESE COOPERATION. IF THE IMPRESSION IS CREATED THAT THERE IS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JAPAN IT WILL EFFECTIVELY INHIBIT COOPERATION.

22. OUR TACTIC SHOULD BE AS IT WAS DURING THE TOKAI MURA NEGOTIATIONS, TO STRIVE CONSTANTLY TO ILLUMINATE THE DIALOGUE WITH INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND TO WIDEN THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND CONCERN. WE CAN DO THIS BY CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VISITS OF EXPERTS AND POLICY LEADERS, BY PROVIDING A STEADY FLOW OF INFORMATION, BY INSTITUTIONALIZING MEETINGS OF OFFICIALS ENGAGED IN DECISION-MAKING IN THIS AREA, AND BY INSTITUTING AND MAINTAINING LONG TERM JOINT PROGRAMS IN TECHNICAL AREAS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

23. GOAL VI - "MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDES AND SUPPORTIVE POLICIES ON THE PART OF JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS."

24. AMONG THE BROAD TRENDS LIKELY TO AFFECT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS GOAL OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS IS THE GRADUAL EMERGENCE OF CENTRIST POLITICAL FORCES, BLURRING THE SHARP CONSERVATIVE-
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OPPOSITION DIVISION CHARACTERISTIC OF POST-WAR JAPANESE POLITICS AND LEADING TO WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACHES, GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE STATUS QUO. PARALLELING AND REINFORCING THIS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT HAS COME TO PLACE ADDED STRESS ON BREAD-AND-BUTTER ISSUES AT THE EXPENSE OF MORE OVERTLY POLITICAL THEMES.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

25. IN ADDITION TO MONITORING AND ANALYZING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND LABOR SPECTRUM TO DETERMINE ITS IMPACT ON KEY ISSUES AND U.S. INTERESTS GENERALLY, WE WILL, IN WORKING TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL:

A. ENCOURAGE AND EXPAND EXCHANGES OF PARLIAMENTARIANS, LABOR UNION OFFICIALS AND GOVERNMENT LABOR OFFICIALS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEEPEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY AREAS, AND underscore THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND U.S.-JAPAN TIES.

B. CONTINUE EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH THE JAPANESE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, EXCEPTING ONLY THE COMMUNISTS, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE CENTRIST PARTIES' LEADERSHIP.

C. CONTINUE CULTIVATION OF CLOSE EMBASSY TIES WITH THE DOMEI LABOR FEDERATION AND PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONS, AND FURTHER FACILITATE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE AFL-CIO AND THE SOHYO LABOR FEDERATION.

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25. GOAL VII - "HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING FOSTERED BY SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATIONAL INTERCHANGE."

26. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN JAPAN GIVEN THE TENDENCY OF THE MEDIA TO PRESENT ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS OF USG POLICY DIRECTIONS. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF OUR POLICIES CAN FREQUENTLY BE AFFECTED IN AN ADVERSE WAY. ECONOMIC ISSUES, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD QUITE EASILY BECOME EMOTIONAL,

POLITICAL ISSUES UNLESS A SPECIAL ATTEMPT IS MADE TO COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY AT ALL LEVELS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE REACH THE MEDIA AND OTHERS IN JAPAN WHO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION AND USIS WILL HAVE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS EFFORT, DEVOTING ITS RESOURCES TO PROJECTS SUPPORTIVE OF THE MISSION'S PRIORITY GOALS IN ALL AREAS.

27. WITH RESPECT TO EXCHANGES THE MISSION'S APPROACH WILL BE TO UTILIZE OUR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AS PART OF A MAJOR EFFORT COMPLEMENTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S.-JAPAN FRIENDSHIP COMMISSION, THE FULBRIGHT COMMISSION AND PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS WORKING FOR THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN ORDER TO CREATE A BETTER LONG-RANGE CLIMATE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. SPECIAL EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO THOSE LEADERS AND POTENTIAL LEADERS WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE ON BILATERAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN. EMPHASIS WILL ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE PERFORMING AND VISUAL ARTS AND TO THOSE IN A POSITION TO INTRODUCE NEW PROCESSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE QUALITY OF LIFE BOTH IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. AMERICAN SOCIETY MUST BE PROJECTED IN A WAY THAT WILL PROVIDE A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF OUR PEOPLE AND THE UNDERLYING STRENGTHS OF OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. USIS RESOURCES--THE LIBRARIES AND SEMINAR PROGRAMS IN PARTICULAR--WILL BE DIRECTED AT THIS OBJECTIVE MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR AMERICAN AND JAPANESE IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS TO MEET TOGETHER REGULARLY TO ARRIVE AT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH

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